Women As Constitutional Equals: The Burger Court\u27s Overdue Evolution by Seymour, Stephanie K.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 33 
Issue 1 Dedicated to the U.S. Supreme Court 
Fall 1997 
Women As Constitutional Equals: The Burger Court's Overdue 
Evolution 
Stephanie K. Seymour 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Stephanie K. Seymour, Women As Constitutional Equals: The Burger Court's Overdue Evolution, 33 Tulsa 
L. J. 23 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol33/iss1/4 
This Supreme Court Review Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital 
Commons. For more information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
WOMEN AS CONSTITUTIONAL EQUALS: THE
BURGER COURT'S OVERDUE EVOLUTION*
The Honorable Stephanie K. Seymourt
The Declaration of Independence declared in 1776, "[w]e hold these Truths
to be self-evident; that all Men are created equal."' We learned in our civics
and political science courses, from our history and our culture, that those ring-
ing words meant just what they said-all men are created equal. When the
Fourteenth Amendment to our Constitution was ratified in 1868, it declared
that:
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileg-
es or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.'
"Person" is a seemingly broader word than "man," but the enactment of the
Fourteenth Amendment did not make women equal under the law either. In the
century that followed its adoption, right through the era of the Warren Court,
women were considered inferior to men under our Constitution, except where it
came to child-rearing and homemaking.
The Burger Court created a defining moment in legal history by recogniz-
ing for the first time that the Constitution protects women against gender dis-
crimination. Before 1971, the Court had rejected every challenge to legislative
enactments that disadvantaged women because of their sex. By 1986, the Court
had put in place an approach to gender-based laws that required them to have
an exceedingly persuasive justification and a substantial relationship to the
achievement of their goals. This dramatic change in our legal history, belated as
it was, mirrored an equally dramatic change in the role of women in society,
and the political recognition of that change.
* Copyright © THE BuriGER CoURT A RETROSPECnVE (Bernard Schwartz, ed. Oxford University
Press, 1998 forthcoming). This paper is a revised and expanded version of the talk, given at the Burger Court
Conference at the University of Tulsa College of Law on October 1, 1996.
t Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The author acknowledges with
appreciation the assistance of her law clerk, Nancy L. Vyhnal, in the composition of this paper.
1. THE DECLARATION OF IDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Any examination of gender and the law during the Burger Court must
recognize the extraordinary contribution to the evolutionary process made by
Ruth Bader Ginsburg. Until her appointment to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia in 1980, she filed briefs with the Supreme
Court in most of the cases on the path toward constitutional protection, and she
argued several of them She wrote prolifically, providing thoughtful and schol-
arly insight and perspective on the cases as they came down, and on the effect
upon them of the times in which they were decided.4 The quality of her en-
deavors was itself a refutation of the stereotypical view that women had no
place in the world outside the home and could make no meaningful contribution
to that world. It is therefore altogether fitting that Justice Ginsburg recently
wrote the latest chapter in the Supreme Court's recognition that the Fourteenth
Amendment protects against gender discrimination-the VMI case.5
Before 1971, the Supreme Court had never met a gender distinction it did
not like. The most egregious examples are by now well known, but they bear
repeating because they are telling indications of how far the law has evolved. In
the first gender case decided under the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment,
Myra Bradwell applied unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court of Illinois for a li-
cense to practice law. She challenged the denial of her application in the United
States Supreme Court, which upheld the denial by concluding that admission to
the bar of a state is not a privilege or immunity belonging to United States
citizens.6 In an oft-quoted concurring opinion, Justice Bradley, joined by two
other Justices, said the following:
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man
is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it
for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the family
organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly
belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to
say identity, of interests and views which belong, or should belong, to the
family institution is repugnant to the idea of a woman adopting a distinct
and independent career from that of her husband .... The paramount
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of
wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator.7
Mrs. Bradwell's desire to practice law thus violated divine ordinance, the nature
of things, and the law of the Creator, all of which were so apparent to Justice
3. See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 LAW &
INEQ. J. 381, 381 and n.3 (1994).
4. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Burger Court's Grapplings with Sex Discrimination, in THE
BURGER CoURT: THE Co'mrER-REvoLrnoN THAT WASN'T 132 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) [hereinafter
Ginsburg, The Burger Court]; Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to
Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Roe v. Wade].
5. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. 2264 (1996).
6. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
7. Id. at 141.
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Bradley and his Brethren that he saw no need to cite authority for these pro-
nouncements.
Things did not improve. Two years later, Virginia Minor challenged as
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment a provision of the Missouri State Con-
stitution that restricted the right to vote to men only. The Supreme Court reject-
ed the challenge on the ground that voting was not a privilege or immunity of
citizenship, and that the states were therefore free to limit the right of suffrage
to men alone.'
Even the Lochner-era Court, which disapproved of nearly every attempted
government regulation of the workplace, upheld limitations on working hours
for women. The Court took judicial notice "[tihat woman's physical structure
and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the
struggle for subsistence" and "that woman has always been dependent upon
man."9 The Court concluded that:
[i]t is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that [a woman] still looks
to her brother and depends on him. Even [if] all restrictions on political,
personal, and contractual rights were taken away, and she stood, so far as
statutes are concerned, upon an absolutely equal plane with him, it would
still be true that she is so constituted that she will rest upon and look to
him for protection; that her physical structure and a proper discharge of
her maternal functions - having in view not merely her own health, but
the well-being of the race - justify legislation to protect her from the
greed as well as the passion of man.10
Many years later, a woman unsuccessfully sought an injunction to restrain
the enforcement of a Michigan law that restricted her from obtaining a
bartender's license unless she was the wife or daughter of the male owner of a
licensed liquor establishment." In upholding enforcement of the law, the Su-
preme Court approved the state's legislative judgment that bartending by wom-
en should be limited in order to prevent moral and social problems.
As recently as 1961, the Warren Court's opinion in Hoyt v. Florida,"2
stands as discouraging proof that the more things had changed during the ninety
years after Mrs. Bradwell tried to practice law, the more they had stayed the
same. Gwendolyn Hoyt was convicted of second-degree murder by assaulting
her husband with a baseball bat. "As described by the Florida Supreme Court,
the affair occurred in the context of a marital upheaval involving.., the sus-
pected infidelity of [Mrs. Hoyt's] husband, and culminating in the husband's
final rejection of his wife's efforts at reconciliation." Mrs. Hoyt claimed that
her trial before an all-male jury deprived her of her right to equal protection
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The jury had been selected under a state
statute that allowed women to serve on juries only if they affirmatively request-
8. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
9. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421 (1908).
10. Id. at 422.
11. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
12. 368 U.S. 57, 59 (1961).
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ed to be put on the jury list. Few women had done so. In an opinion by Justice
Harlan, the Supreme Court upheld the conviction, echoing the words of Justice
Bradley:
Despite the enlightened emancipation of women from the restrictions and
protections of bygone years, and their entry into many parts of community
life formerly considered to be reserved to men, woman is still regarded as
the center of home and family life. We cannot say that it is constitution-
ally impermissible for a State, acting in pursuit of the general welfare, to
conclude that a woman should be relieved from the civic duty of jury
service unless she herself determines that such service is consistent with
her own special responsibilities.
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result.
All the other Justices fully joined the opinion.
Ten years after Hoyt in the seminal case of Reed v. Reed, 4 the Burger
Court changed the face of equal-protection jurisprudence in a case that chal-
lenged an Idaho statute providing that as between a man and a woman equally
qualified to administer an estate, the man must be preferred. The state defended
the statute as a matter of administrative convenience and as a means of
avoiding intra family controversy. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unani-
mous Court, refused to give these reasons dispositive weight, holding instead
that the statute established arbitrary preferences in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the first time the Court
refused to defer to a state legislature's view of the circumstances in which
women should be treated differently from men.
In deciding the Reed case, the Court took a fresh and critical look at a
statute adversely impacting women. The Court's willingness to assess for itself
the legitimacy of a state's reasons for enacting gender discriminatory laws con-
tinued during the Burger Court years and beyond, and revolutionized the legal
status of women. The first question that comes to mind in understanding the
evolution of the revolution is, why? What factors were present in 1971 and the
following years to influence and reorder the Court's thinking about a woman's
place in the world that were not at work in 1961?
The paternalistic language which the pre-Burger Court cases used in ap-
proving gender distinctions reflected the ambiguous nature of society's attitude
toward women that was prevalent in those times and unfortunately still persists
to some extent today. 5 Women were "'both put on a pedestal and deemed not
fully developed persons.""..6 The concept of women as the weaker sex arose in
the dim past when physical strength was often necessary to success in the world
beyond the home. Because women were disadvantaged by their role as child-
13. Id. at 61-62.
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. See John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutinyfor Gender, Via Croson, 93 COLum. L. REv. 508, 538 (1993)
[hereinafter Galotto, Strict Scrutiny].
16. Id. (quoting RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ISSUES: FIVE STUDIES 19(1980)).
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bearer and by their relative physical weakness in a world requiring physical
strength, they were viewed as unsuited for worldly endeavors and in need of
protection. Kept as they were out of the commercial arena, women were seen as
both unable to hold their own there, and better and more innocent because they
were untainted by it. This attitude continued even after women began to be-
come active in commerce and the trades, evidenced by the many cases justify-
ing restrictions on women's activity as necessary to accommodate their position
as the weaker sex.
Technology has long since leveled the playing field by eliminating the
advantage previously resulting from physical strength. As Ruth Bader Ginsburg
observed in 1980, other changes in society were also at work propelling women
out of the home, off the pedestal, and out into the workforce.
In the years 1947 to 1961.... there was unprecedented growth in em-
ployment outside the home of women from ages forty-five to sixty-four.
A steep increase for younger women followed later, coinciding with, and
shored up by, a revived feminist movement-a movement caused by, and
in turn spotlighting, dramatic alterations in women's lives. Salient factors
in the changing work and roles of women include a sharp decline in nec-
essary home-centered activity; few goods we consume at home must be
made there nowadays. Coupled with that, expansion of the economy's
service sector opened places for women in traditional as well as new
occupations. Curtailed population goals, facilitated by more effective
means of controlling reproduction, count as well among important ingre-
dients in this social dynamic. Also central to women's increasing opportu-
nity is the phenomenon of vastly extended life spans. The combination of
these last two developments creates a setting in which the typical woman,
for the first time, is experiencing most of her adult years in a household
not dominated by childcare requirements. In addition, inflation has
boosted attraction to gainful employment for wife as well as husband.
These conditions, along with changing marriage patterns, account in sig-
nificant measure for the prevalence of the two-earner family, a unit in-
creasingly more common than the family in which a man is the sole
breadwinner. In fewer than a dozen years, according to mid-1970s Bureau
of Labor Statistics projections, two-thirds of all women between ages
twenty-five and fifty-four would be gainfully employed. 7
One dramatic change in the legal landscape during the Burger Court years
may have had the greatest impact of all on the legal status of women. When I
graduated from law school in 1965, only 4% of the law school graduates were
women.' By 1971, when the Reed case was decided, the number of women
enrolling in law school was approximately nine percent. 9 By 1986, the end of
the Burger Court era, almost forty-one percent of the enrolling law students
were women.20 In addition to graduating from law school, women began to be
17. Ginsburg, The Burger Court, supra note 4, at 139-140 (footnotes omitted).
18. See A Review of Legal Education in the United States, 1995 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMus-
SIONS TO THE BAR REP. 67.
19. Id.
20. Id.
1997]
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appointed as judges in increasing numbers. President Carter began the revolu-
tion for the federal courts, appointing eleven women to the courts of appeals
and twenty-three women to the district bench between 1976 and 1980. President
Reagan continued the trend during his eight years in office by appointing San-
dra Day O'Connor to the Supreme Court in 1981, six women to the courts of
appeals, and twenty-four women as district judges. Similar changes were taking
place on the state courts.
The changes in society and the legal field were reflected in the legislative
sphere. Prior to the watershed Reed decision, Congress passed the Equal Pay
Ace' in 1963 and the Civil Rights Act in 1964, Title VII of which prohibited
employment discrimination on the basis of sex.' Congressional action after the
Reed decision continued to enhance the ability of women to enter on an equal
footing areas traditionally reserved to men. In 1972, the Equal Rights Amend-
ment was passed by Congress and began its journey to obtain approval among
the states, although it ultimately failed. That same year, Congress passed Title
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972,' which prohibited sex discrimi-
nation in any educational program or facility receiving federal funds, and
amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to extend protection against sex
discrimination to federal employees.' In 1974, Congress passed the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex or mar-
ital status with respect to credit transactions. In 1978, in response to a case in
which the Burger Court had detoured from its general trend of recognizing and
striking down sex discrimination,' Congress again amended Title VII by pass-
ing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.27 And in 1980, Congress passed the
Science and Engineering Equal Opportunities Act,' which authorized the Na-
tional Science Foundation to increase the participation of women in courses of
study leading to degrees in science and engineering and to encourage women to
pursue careers in those fields.
This then was the social, legal, and political climate during the Burger
Court years. The birth of gender equality jurisprudence was less a product of
the Court than a product of the times; it was an idea whose time had clearly
come. Indeed, given the across-the-board rejection of gender claims by the
Court before 1971, the Supreme Court's gender discrimination doctrine had no
place to go but forward. Be that as it may, when the Burger Court years were
over, the law of sex discrimination had been permanently altered, along with
the opportunities available to women to enter professions formerly reserved to
men. The Court accomplished this alteration in a series of cases that devel-
21. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1994).
23. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1994).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
26. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (disability plan's failure to cover pregnancy-
related disabilities does not violate Title VII).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 1885a (1994).
[Vol. 33:23
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oped and applied an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny to statutes that would
previously have been approved as within the legislature's prerogative to deal
with woman's place in the scheme of things. In the years leading up to the
Reed decision, most statutory classifications were evaluated for equal-protection
purposes under the rational-basis test, an extremely deferential standard which
required only that the difference in treatment not be "wholly irrelevant to the
achievement of the State's objective," and justified by any reasonably conceiv-
able state of facts.29 Before Reed, the rational basis test was used to uphold
every law that discriminated against women, the rational basis being woman's
role as mother, caretaker of the home, and a person unfit or incapable of em-
ployment in a man's world.
The Court had applied a much more exacting level of scrutiny to those
legislative classifications it regarded as "suspect." Footnote four of the Carolene
Products case ° is generally regarded to be the origin of the notion of applying
strict scrutiny to suspect classifications.31 The Court indicated there that the
presumption of the constitutionality of statutes might not operate so broadly
with respect to legislation directed at racial minorities, observing that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry."32 The idea that minorities might need more
protection from discriminatory laws than that provided by the rational basis test
was further developed in the Korematsu case,33 in which the Court noted that
legal restrictions limiting the civil rights of a single racial group should be
viewed as suspect and subjected to strict scrutiny.3 The rationale underlying
application of this standard, as implied in the cases from which it arose, is the
belief that suspect classes are not likely to be represented in the legislature, and
that the political process therefore could not be relied on to ensure that their
interests would be taken into account. Under the strict scrutiny standard, laws
must have a compelling objective and must promote that objective by the least
restrictive means 6 Although the wartime restrictions on Japanese Americans
at issue in Korematsu survived strict scrutiny, virtually all statutes that have
since been subjected to that standard have been invalidated.37
In the first step toward a new equal-protection landscape for women taken
in Reed, the Court purported to apply the rational-basis test in assessing wheth-
er the statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment's equal-protection mandate.
The Court thus articulated the inquiry as assessing whether the classification
29. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
30. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
31. See Galotto, Strict Scrutiny, supra note 15, at 513.
32. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4.
33. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
34. Id. at 216.
35. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: T1E BURGER COURT IN ACTION 219 (1990).
36. Ginsburg, The Burger Court, supra note 4, at 133.
37. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 220.
1997]
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was reasonable and had a fair and substantial relationship to the legislation's
objective. The outcome, however, was not the one that application of the ratio-
nal-basis test had always previously produced. Although the Court accepted the
statute's objectives as legitimate, that is, to avoid intra-family fights and to
provide administrative convenience in estate administration, it nevertheless
concluded that the means chosen were arbitrary rather than reasonable. As Ruth
Bader Ginsburg noted in an article, "[The Reed decision attracted headlines; it
marked the first solid break from the Supreme Court's consistent affirmation of
governmental authority to classify by sex. The terse Reed opinion acknowl-
edged no departure from precedent, but Court-watchers recognized that some-
thing new was in the wind."38
With the Reed decision the genie was out of the bottle, the toothpaste was
out of the tube, and there was no turning back. As one commentator has noted,
"[R]ights, once set loose, are very difficult to contain; rights consciousness-on
and off the Court-is a powerful engine of legal mobilization and change."'39
The Burger Court had begun a journey toward recognition of gender equality.
As a review of subsequent decisions reveals, however, the train was driven not
by an overarching jurisprudential vision, but by social and political change and
by the views of the Justices about the facts of particular cases.'
Two years after the Reed decision, the Court issued Frontiero v. Richard-
son,4 the opinion many consider to be the high-water mark in the movement
toward gender equality.42 The case challenged military statutes under which
families of male soldiers were granted greater benefits than families of female
soldiers. A majority of a three-judge district court panel upheld the statutes on
the basis of administrative convenience, which was in turn premised upon the
panel's view that because the husband is generally the "breadwinner" in most
families he is rarely a dependent for purposes of receiving benefits for military
dependents. Ruth Bader Ginsburg argued the case in the Supreme Court as
amicus for the American Civil Liberties Union. After an exchange of views
among the Justices concerning the standard of review," Justice Brennan
authored a plurality opinion holding that classifications based upon sex were
suspect and therefore subject to strict scrutiny. Citing the infamous passage
from the concurrence in Bradwell,"5 Justice Brennan pointed to the nation's
long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination, "rationalized by an attitude
of 'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedes-
38. Ginsburg, The Burger Court, supra note 4, at 133.
39. Joel B. Grossman, Constitutional Policymaking in the Burger Years, 86 Mica. L. REV. 1414, 1416
(1988) (reviewing TIE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME COURT (Herman Schwartz
ed., 1987)).
40. See Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Roe v. Wade, supra note 4, at 378; Paul Bender, Is the Burger
Court Really Like the Warren Court, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 635, 652-53 (1984) (reviewing THE BURGER COURT.
TE COUNTER-REVOLUtrON THAT WASN'T (Blasi ed., 1983)); Grossman, supra note 39, at 1417-18.
41. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
42. Galotto, Strict Scrutiny, supra note 15, at 520.
43. See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 681.
44. See ScHwARTZ, supra note 35, at 222-26.
45. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
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tal, but in a cage."' He noted that women still faced pervasive discrimination
in educational institutions, in employment, and in the political arena.47 Justice
Brennan was unable to persuade a majority of the Court to his view that sex is
a suspect class. Justice Powell concurred only in the judgment, believing that
categorizing sex as suspect would preempt the political process in light of the
fact that the Equal Rights Amendment had been passed by Congress and sub-
mitted to the states for ratification.' Interestingly, Chief Justice Burger, whose
opinion in Reed had started it all, wrote to Justice Brennan stating that as the
author of Reed, he had "never remotely contemplated such a broad concept."'49
The Chief Justice joined the concurrence of Justice Powell. Justice Rehnquist
was the lone dissenter. A year later, the Court heard Kahn v. Shevin," which
challenged a Florida statute providing a tax break to widows but not to widow-
ers. Ruth Bader Ginsburg again argued to the Court, contending that the
statute's gender distinction violated equal protection. Justice Douglas disagreed,
holding for the Court that because a single woman indisputably faced greater
financial difficulties than those facing a single man, the statute undoubtedly met
the "substantial relation" requirement of the rational-basis test. He distinguished
Frontiero as a case in which the gender distinction was justified solely by ad-
ministrative convenience. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and White dissented on
the basis that sex was a suspect class requiring a greater justification than that
offered by the state. Kahn is a revealing case for several reasons. It under-
scored the fact that Justice Brennan's position on sex as a suspect class was not
that of a majority of the Court, and it did so by approving a gender distinction
made in an attempt to benefit women and to remedy the effects of what the
Court referred to as "overt discrimination or... the socialization process of a
male-dominated culture."' The Court used the same rationale in Schlesinger v.
Ballard,52 to uphold a discriminatory up-or-out military policy favoring wom-
en. Indeed, the notion that gender distinctions pass constitutional muster when
made to remedy discrimination and provide a special benefit to women is one
that surfaced frequently during the Burger Court's struggle with gender issues.
It often explained the Court's approval of some classifications drawn on gender
lines and not others. This paternalistic view has been challenged as a short-term
gain but a long-term loss for women because it perpetuates the notion that
women are somehow weaker, less able to compete on their own, and in need of
special treatment. To the extent that a statutory benefit favoring women is truly
intended and described as a remedy for past discrimination rather than as pro-
tection for the weaker sex, however, it is in my judgment a valuable tool to
boost women on their way to equality. After upholding gender distinctions
46. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 684.
47. Id. at 686.
48. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 224.
49. Id. at 225 (quoting Chief Justice Burger).
50. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
51. Id. at 353.
52. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
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in Kahn and Ballard on the basis of their protective and remedial purposes, the
Court again shifted gears. In Taylor v. Louisiana,3 decided only a week after
Ballard, the Court struck down a jury selection system identical to that upheld
earlier in Hoyt. The Court agreed with the male defendant in Taylor that the
challenged system denied him his Sixth Amendment right to a jury drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community. In so doing, the Court rejected the Hoyt
rationale, stating that "[if it was ever the case that women were unqualified to
sit on juries or were so situated that none of them should be required to per-
form jury service, that time has long since passed .... Communities differ at
different times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or place is
not necessarily a fair cross section at another time or a different place."54
Times and the law were changing. The Chief Justice concurred in the result and
Justice Rehnquist dissented.
In Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,55 Ruth Bader Ginsburg again appeared be-
fore the Court, arguing that a Social Security statute denied equal protection by
granting benefits to the surviving spouse of a working man, while denying
benefits to the surviving spouse of a working woman. Justice Brennan held for
the Court that the gender distinction at issue was indistinguishable from that
struck down in Frontiero. While acknowledging that some empirical evidence
supported the notion that men were more likely than women to be the primary
supporters of their spouses and children, the Court nonetheless held this ratio-
nale insufficient to "justify a gender-based distinction which diminishes the
protection afforded to women who do work." '56 Justice Brennan hedged his
bets in articulating the framework under which the provision was held invalid,
drawing parallels with the statute struck down on the basis of strict scrutiny by
the plurality in Frontiero, while relying on language from Reed to actually
declare the statute unconstitutional. Justice Powell wrote a more narrowly
drawn concurrence in which the Chief Justice joined. Once again, Justice
Rehnquist dissented.
In 1975, the Court also invalidated a Utah statute under which women
attained the age of majority at eighteen and were then no longer eligible for
child support, while men did not reach majority until age twenty-one. In
Stanton v. Stanton,57 a divorced wife sued for support payments for her daugh-
ter after the daughter turned eighteen. The Utah Supreme Court sustained the
statute against an equal-protection challenge, holding that support for male
children should continue longer, based on the "'old notions.., that generally
it is the man's primary responsibility to provide a home and its essentials, [and
that therefore] it is a salutary thing for him to get a good education and/or
training before he undertakes those responsibilities."" Justice Blackmun, writ-
53. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
54. Id. at 537.
55. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
56. Id. at 648.
57. 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
58. Id. at 10 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 517 P.2d 1010, 1012 (Utah 1974)).
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ing for the Court over Justice Rehnquist's lone dissent, concluded that the stat-
ute did not survive equal-protection attack "under any test-compelling state
interest, or rational basis, or something in between."59 In a blistering rejection
of the "old notions" relied upon by the state court, Justice Blackmun pointed
out that:
Women's activities and responsibilities are increasing and expanding.
Coeducation is a fact, not a rarity. The presence of women in business, in
the professions, in government and, indeed, in all walks of life where edu-
cation is a desirable, if not always a necessary, antecedent is apparent and
a proper subject of judicial notice. If a specified age of minority is re-
quired for the boy in order to assure him parental support while he attains
his education and training, so, too, is it for the girl. To distinguish be-
tween the two on educational grounds is to be self-serving: if the female
is not to be supported so long as the male, she hardly can be expected to
attend school as long as he does, and bringing her education to an end
earlier coincides with the role-typing society has long imposed.'
Thus, approximately one hundred years after the Court took judicial notice
that under the law of the Creator the paramount destiny of women was the
domestic sphere, the Court now was taking judicial notice of women's activities
in business, the professions, government, and indeed in all walks of life. Wom-
en had made progress not only in changing their place in the world, but in the
critical area of changing the Court's underlying perception of their place in the
world. The Supreme Court was finally getting the message that stereotyping all
women did a great injustice to those women who did not fit the stereotype.
This progress was stabilized by the 1976 decision in Craig v. Boren,61 in
which the Court for the first time expressly adopted and applied an intermediate
level of scrutiny to gender classifications.62 The case presented a challenge to
an Oklahoma statute that discriminated against males in the sale of 3.2% beer.
Building upon language in Reed, Justice Brennan stated the standard for the
Court as follows: "classifications by gender must serve important governmental
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those -objec-
tives."'63 The Court pointed out that cases following Reed had rejected adminis-
trative convenience as a sufficiently important objective. Significantly, the Court
also recognized that "increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role
of females in the home rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas' were
rejected as loose-fitting characterizations incapable of supporting state statutory
schemes that were premised upon their accuracy." Justice Powell specially
concurred and, in expressing some misgivings about the opinion's discussion of
the appropriate standard for equal-protection analysis of gender claims, correctly
predicted that the opinion would be viewed as adopting a middle-tier approach
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id. at 15.
61. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
62. LAwRENCE H. TRiBu, AMERICAN CONSTMITUIONAL LAW § 16-26, at 1564 (2d ed. 1988).
63. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
64. Id. at 198-99.
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subjecting such classifications "to a more critical examination than is normally
applied when.. . 'suspect classes' are not present."'65 Chief Justice Burger
dissented because he was unable to accept the Court's decision to make "gender
a disfavored classification. '"
The Court applied the intermediate level of scrutiny in the 1977 case of
Califano v. Goldfarb,' in which Ruth Bader Ginsburg again appeared before
the Court to assert the unconstitutionality of a Social Security benefits statute
that favored widows over widowers. Justice Brennan, writing for plurality,
again agreed. He denounced as unconstitutional sex classifications based on
archaic and over broad generalizations about women that are more consistent
with stereotypes than with reality.' Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment.
Chief Justice Burger joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent, along with Justices
Stewart and Blackmun.
Three weeks later, in Califano v. Webster,' the Court upheld another So-
cial Security benefits statute that permitted female wage earners to exclude
three more lower earning years than a similarly situated male, thereby resulting
in a higher level of old-age benefits for the retired female wage earner. The
Court concluded that the gender classification passed constitutional muster
because it actually reduced the "disparity in economic condition between men
and women caused by the long history of discrimination against women [which]
has been recognized as... an important governmental objective."70 In so do-
ing, the Court cautioned that "'the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory
purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme,"' and distinguished cases in
which a scheme that purported to remedy past discrimination was not enacted
for that purpose or actually penalized women wage earners."' The Court up-
held the statutory provision because it attempted to account for job discrimina-
tion that prevented women from earning as much as men and thereby operated
to compensate women for that past discrimination. The Chief Justice and three
other Justices concurred for the reasons given in Justice Rehnquist's dissent in
Goldfarb.
The decision in Webster, when contrasted with those in Goldfarb and
Wiesenfeld, illustrates the flexible manner in which the Court used the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny. The middle-tier approach allowed "the Justices to
base their decisions upon their individual perceptions of the reasonableness of
the sexual classification and the governmental interest asserted in each case."'
Webster also revealed the enduring appeal of gender classifications that are
65. Id. at 210 and n* (Powell, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 217 (Burger, J., dissenting).
67. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
68. See id. at 207.
69. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiamn).
70. Id. at 317.
71. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
72. SCHWARTZ, supra note 35, at 229; see also Earl M. Maltz, Legislative Inputs and Gender-Based
Discrimination in the Burger Court, 90 MiCH. L. REv. 1023 (1992).
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protective and remedial.
The decisions mentioned are only a fraction of those decided by the Burger
Court dealing with gender classifications. This paper has focused on them be-
cause they highlight the Court's progress toward recognizing women's changing
place in society and its development of a framework for analyzing gender
claims that takes that change into account. The standard the Court adopted was
probably as stringent as possible given the make-up of the Court and the wide-
spread persistence of sexual stereotyping in the teeth of reality. And, despite the
heightened scrutiny, the Court nevertheless persisted for a time in upholding
statutes obviously enacted to protect the weaker sex. The outcomes often turned
as much on the views of the individual Justices as on subtle factual distinctions.
As a result, the Court's steps toward gender equality were uneven, arguably
inconsistent, and subject to the charge of being result oriented.' Although the
Court's treatment of gender was perhaps not ideal, we must remember that the
Court was being asked to make rapid changes in an area long ignored. The end
result was to acknowledge and give legal force and protection to women's
movement out of the home and into the world.
The changing framework within which the Supreme Court evaluated the
roles and rights of women in society is manifest even in cases that at least
facially did not deal with gender equality. The cases defining the scope of re-
productive rights are a good example. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 4 the Court
held that it is an invasion of privacy for the State to regulate the use of con-
traceptives by a married couple. Several of the opinions in Griswold focused on
the privileged place of the marital institution, and the importance of protecting
decisions relating to the creation and raising of a family from interference by
the government. Justice Douglas referred to the privacy surrounding marriage as
"older than the Bill of Rights."75 The Court still perceived reproductive rights
to be bound up in the traditional view of womanhood as inside the family, to be
given expression only within that specific social and historical context. But
successive decisions by the Court gradually eroded the notion of reproductive
rights rooted in the social institutions of marriage and family, in favor of a
notion of privacy rights held by individuals.76 The theory that a woman has an
individual privacy right in making decisions about her own reproduction
achieved full expression in the Burger Court's 1973 decision in Roe v.
Wade.7' Whatever one may think of the substance of Roe and its progeny, it is
clear that the change from a view of women's rights as rooted in and derived
from social institutions and history, to a vision of rights possessed by women as
aspects of their individual personhood, created the necessary preconditions for
broader progress in the treatment of women under the law. To persist in the
73. See Cavanaugh, supra note 3, at 391-400.
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
75. Id. at 486.
76. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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vision of women's rights as derivative would have been dehumanizing and at
odds with the changes sweeping society at large.
Three gender classification cases form a bridge from the Burger Court to
the present day. In 1982, the Burger Court heard Mississippi Univ. for Women
v. Hogan,78 which presented an equal protection challenge to a state statute
that excluded men from a state-supported nursing school. By then, Sandra Day
O'Connor had been appointed as the first woman to sit on the Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor authored an opinion for the five Justices who voted to strike
down the statute. In so doing, she stated several principles that had emerged
from the Court's past equal protection analysis. First, she said that the statute
was not exempt from scrutiny or subject to a lesser standard of review merely
because it discriminated against males rather than females. She reiterated that
the applicable test was the one set out in Craig v. Boren, under which a state
must show that the classification serves important governmental objectives and
that the discriminatory means used are substantially related to the achievement
of those objectives. She cautioned that this test must be applied "free of fixed
notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females."79 She criti-
cized the view that protective and paternalistic objectives were valid, pointing
out that "if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one
gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be
innately inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate."8
Determining whether the requisite substantial relationship exists must be
done "through reasoned analysis rather than through the mechanical application
of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and
women."'" Justice O'Connor recognized that in limited circumstances "a gen-
der-based classification favoring one sex can be justified if it intentionally and
directly assists members of the sex that is disproportionately burdened," but she
"emphasized that 'the mere recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not
an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes
underlying a statutory scheme."'82 In rejecting the state's argument that exclud-
ing males compensated for discrimination against women and constituted educa-
tional affirmative action, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the state's policy
actually perpetuated the stereotype of nursing as women's work, and helped
make the assumption that nursing is a field for women a self-fulfilling prophe-
cy." Interestingly, she noted evidence that excluding men from the nursing
field depressed wages, and observed that the state's policy may thus be penaliz-
ing the very class the state purported to benefit. 4 The Chief Justice dissented
along with Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist.
78. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
79. Id. at 724-25.
80. Id. at 725.
81. Id. at 726.
82. Id. at 728 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiensenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)).
83. See id. at 729-30.
84. See id. at 729 n.15.
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Twelve years later, in J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 5 the Rehnquist
Court considered whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits peremptory
challenges to potential jurors on the basis of gender. J.E.B. was the defendant in
a paternity suit which was heard by an all-female jury due to the state's exer-
cise of its peremptory challenges. Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
began his discussion by observing that, because women had been excluded from
jury duty for most of the country's existence, gender-based peremptory chal-
lenges were a relatively recent occurrence. This historical exclusion of women
was derived from the English common law and was framed in this country as
"the ostensible need to protect women from the ugliness and depravity of trials.
Women were thought to be too fragile and virginal to withstand the polluted
courtroom atmosphere." 6 Justice Blackmun pointed out that, beginning with
Reed v. Reed,
this Court consistently has subjected gender-based classifications to
heightened scrutiny in recognition of the real danger that government
policies that professedly are based on reasonable considerations in fact
may be reflective of "archaic and overbroad" generalizations about gen-
der, or based on "outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
in the home rather than in the 'marketplace and world of ideas.'"'
The state's proffered justification was based upon the perception that men
might be more sympathetic to a male defendant in a paternity suit, while wom-
en might be more sympathetic to the complaining witness, the mother. The
Court refused to "accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory challenges
'the very stereotype the law condemns,"' 88 characterizing this rationale as
reminiscent of the arguments advanced to justify the total exclusion of
women from juries. [The state] offers virtually no support for the conclu-
sion that gender alone is an accurate predictor of juror's attitudes; yet it
urges this Court to condone the same stereotypes that justified the whole-
sale exclusion of women from juries and the ballot box. 9
In addition to the harm to the rights of the litigant, Justice Blackmun em-
phasized the harm resulting to the community and to the individual juror caused
by exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of gender stereotypes.
The community is harmed by the State's participation in the perpetuation
of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our
judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom en-
genders.
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on
gender stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the rela-
tive abilities of men and women. Because these stereotypes have wreaked
injustice in so many other spheres of our country's public life, active dis-
85. 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
86. Id. at 132.
87. Id. at 135 (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 138 (citation omitted).
89. Id. at 138-39 (footnote omitted).
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crimination by litigants on the basis of gender during jury selection "in-
vites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to adhere
to the law."
Individual jurors are harmed because:
[a]ll persons, when granted the opportunity to serve on a jury, have the
right not to be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereo-
typical presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical dis-
crimination. Striking individual jurors on the assumption that they hold
particular views simply because of their gender is "practically a brand
upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority." It denigrates
the dignity of the excluded juror, and, for a woman, reinvokes a history of
exclusion from political participation.9'
The J.E.B. decision stands as a strong reaffirmation of the principles devel-
oped by the Burger Court in rejecting the government's reliance, either implicit-
ly or expressly, on gender stereotypes when defending challenges to gender
discrimination.
The most recent application of the Burger Court's gender equity jurispru-
dence occurred this June in the case of United States v. Virginia (VMI). 2 In a
lovely twist of fate, the opinion was authored by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
named to the Court in 1993, who was given the opportunity to apply the chang-
es in the law that her legal arguments to the Burger Court helped to bring
about. In assessing the challenge presented to Virginia's refusal to admit wom-
en to the Virginia Military Institute, Justice Ginsburg drew upon both Mississip-
pi Univ. for Women and J.E.B. to restate and reaffirm the legal framework that
recognizes and protects a woman's right to share equally in the world beyond
the domestic sphere. She emphasized that the proffered justification for gender
discrimination must be "'exceedingly persuasive,' "genuine," ".not hypothe-
sized or invented post hoc," and not grounded "on overbroad generalizations
about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females."
She pointed out that:
Sex classifications may be used to compensate women "for particular
economic disabilities [they have] suffered," to "promot[e] equal employ-
ment opportunity," to advance full development of the talent and capaci-
ties of our Nation's people. But such classifications may not be used, as
they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic
inferiority of women. 4
Applying these principles to VMI's exclusionary policy, Justice Ginsburg
rejected VMI's argument that excluding women was proper in light of gender-
based developmental differences, observing that "time and again since this
Court's turning point decision in [Reed], we have cautioned reviewing courts to
90. Id. at 140.
91. Id. at 141-42 (footnote and citation omitted).
92. 116 S.Ct 2264 (1996).
93. Id. at 2275.
94. Id. at 2276 (footnOte and citations omitted).
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take a 'hard look' at generalizations or 'tendencies' of the kind pressed by
Virginia ... ,"' and reiterating that "[s]tate actors controlling gates to oppor-
tunity,... may not exclude qualified individuals based on 'fixed notions con-
cerning the roles and abilities of males and females."' 6 Reviewing women's
struggle to enter law schools, medical schools, and federal military academies,
she stated that "[t]he notion that admission of women would downgrade VMI's
stature, destroy the adversative system and, with it, even the school, is a judg-
ment hardly proved, a prediction hardly different from other 'self-fulfilling
prophec[ies], once routinely used to deny rights or opportunities."'" Conclud-
ing that Virginia's "notably circular argument" had "bent and bowed" the appli-
cable test,98 Justice Ginsburg held for the Court that Virginia had fallen far
short of establishing the exceedingly persuasive justification which the Court
now requires to support any gender-defined classification." Significantly, even
Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the judgment of the Court although not its opin-
ion. Justice Scalia dissented and Justice Thomas did not participate.
What the VMI case did most effectively was to quash once and for all sex
stereotyping as a justification for discrimination against women. While recog-
nizing that "most" women would likely not want to endure the extreme physical
and mental discipline and minute regulation of behavior meted out at VMI, the
fact that "some" women could meet the rigorous requirements of the school and
wanted to was sufficient to persuade a majority of the Court that it was a denial
of equal protection for the State of Virginia to provide a VI education for
men and not for women. The VMI case thus stands as the most recent articula-
tion of the enduring legacy of the Burger Court in the area of gender discrimi-
nation: a refusal to allow gender distinctions based on stereotypical notions of a
woman's abilities and her place in the world; a refusal to uphold such distinc-
tions on the basis of purported "benign" justifications that are in fact neither
actual or benign; and an exacting level of scrutiny meant to ensure that this
country's history of discrimination does not repeat itself. Interestingly, the
Court in both Mississippi Univ. for Women and J.E.B. had gone out of its way
to note that it did not need to decide whether gender is a suspect class entitled
to the highest scrutiny because the gender classifications in those cases did not
withstand even intermediate scrutiny.'" In the VMI case, however, the Court
simply applied intermediate scrutiny without mentioning the suspect class issue.
The reason for this change is clear: there is no longer a need to label gender a
suspect class to achieve equality. The Congressional enactments referred to
earlier, which mandated an end to gender discrimination in employment, educa-
tion, and the extension of credit, have for the most part been interpreted favor-
ably to women by both the Burger Court and the Rehnquist Court. These statu-
95. Id. at 2280.
96. Id.
97. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
98. Id. at 2281.
99. See id. at 2282.
100. See Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. 724 n.9; J.E.B., 511 U.S. 137 n.6.
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tory mandates have assisted women in their endeavors to compete with men in
the working world. A solid majority of the current Supreme Court now views
the intermediate level of scrutiny to require the state to demonstrate an "exceed-
ingly persuasive justification" for gender distinctions,'' with a "'strong pre-
sumption that gender classifications are invalid.""' Moreover, as more wom-
en attain legislative positions in which they are involved in creating the statutes
and judicial positions in which they are applying the scrutiny, the intermediate
level of scrutiny will function even more effectively to weed out stereotypes
and paternalism.
In sum, and in answer to the question we have been posed by this book's
title, there was no Warren Court revolution on gender equality for the Burger
Court to either confirm or counter. Rather, the Burger Court was swept up in
the tide of political and social change wrought by women who entered the
workforce by design or by necessity and who objected to being treated as
though they should still be at home cooking dinner and doing the laundry.
Chief Justice Burger rather innocently started the movement with Reed v. Reed,
never intending a revolution, and Justice Brennan took up the call to arms. The
addition of Justice O'Connor to the Court made it more difficult for the Breth-
ren to continue with a straight face upholding statutes which assumed a
woman's place was in the home, dependent on her husband. The ultimate seren-
dipity, of course, was the appointment to the Court of Justice Ginsburg, who
had led the charge for gender equality. Her powers of persuasion will undoubt-
edly ensure that the Fourteenth Amendment's promise of equal protection will
be a reality for women.
101. United States v. Virginia, 116 S. Ct. at 2274.
102. Id. at 2275 (quoting J.E.B., 511 U.S. 137, 152 (Kennedy, J., concurring)),
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